2015 Minsk Ii Agreement

With the 2015 Ukrainian municipal elections scheduled for 25 October, DPR leader Alexander Zakhartchenko adopted a decree on 2 July ordering the sending election on 18 October. [68] He stated that this measure was “in accordance with the Minsk agreements”. [69] According to Zakharchenko, this meant that the DPR had “started to implement the Minsk agreements independently”. [69] Zakharchenko stated that the elections would be held “on the basis of The Ukrainian Law on the Status of Temporary Self-Domination of Certain Districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions”, as they were not in contradiction with the DPR Constitution and laws. [69] The two Minsk agreements will not succeed in resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine politically. The agreements are a framework for conflict management and de-escalation and have a limited impact, as demonstrated by ceasefire violations and the operations of Moscow`s deputies. The Minsk agreements do not change the fundamental calculations of the parties. The new package, commonly referred to as Minsk II, has been criticised as “extremely complicated” and “extremely fragile” and very similar to the failure of the Minsk protocol. [5] [34] [35] The New York Times reported that the plan contained “some Tripwirs,” such as the non-delimitation of control of the city of Debaltseve, which was the scene of the most violent fighting at the time of the plan.” [5] [36] Following the Minsk talks, Chancellor Merkel, President Hollande and President Poroshenko attended a European Union (EU) summit in Brussels. [37] At the summit, participants in Minsk briefed EU heads of state and government on the talks.

During the briefing, they said that President Putin had tried to delay by ten days the establishment of a ceasefire to force Ukrainian troops to abandon their positions in Debaltseve. For his part, President Putin said that The defenders of Debaltseve were surrounded and that the separatists expected them to “lay down their arms and stop resisting”. [37] Andrei Kolesnikov, a journalist from Kommersant, wrote that the implementation of the ceasefire in Debaltseve depends on whether or not the Ukrainian armed forces are encirclement: “Does it exist above all? Vladimir Putin insisted that there is [encirclement] and that it will be strange if a ceasefire agreement is reached, if it is not violated: those in the boiler will certainly try to get by; Those who have cooked this kettle will try to pick up the foam.” [38] The Minsk II agreement, signed in February 2015, cannot be implemented in its current form. The recent escalation of fighting in eastern Ukraine refutes the claim that the agreement has preserved peace in that country. The sequencing and interpretation of the thirteen Minsk II ceasefire provisions is fatally wrong and open to conflicting interpretations. For example, the agreement requires the withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, but never explicitly mentions Russian forces. This poor approach has allowed Russia to blame the lack of progress in Ukraine while continuing to destabilize the country from within. Russia was not ready. Sourkov coordinated the development of additional requirements (published on 13 May in the form of DNR/NRL proposals). These would give even more powers to the occupied regions: responsibility for the legal regulation of the border between Ukraine and Russia; The right to enter into agreements with foreign states; its own charters (which would, for example, prevent the Ukrainian president from dismissing local executive bodies); their own budgets to ensure financial independence; and the right to establish emergencies and hold elections and referendums. Finally, Ukraine would enshrine a neutrality clause in its Constitution.54 In February 2014, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled Kiev after months of street protests.