We are now turning to a family of arguments that work by responding to our intuitive response to cases involving two people whom we will call “victims” and “producers”.. The producer designs or manipulates Victim (in some of the stories, in the way the manufacturer of a robot designs his robot or god a human being; in other stories, using techniques of behavior or neural manipulation). The manufacturer`s objective is to ensure that Victim conducts a specific action (Mele 1995, 2006; Rosen 2002; Pereboom 1995, 2001, 2008, 2014) or that he will have the type of psychology and motivational structure that will ensure or make likely that he is taking certain types of actions and that he is leading a particular life. (See Kane 1996 to discuss Huxley`s Brave New World and Skinner`s Walden Two.) The term “free will” (liberum arbitrium) was introduced by Christian philosophy (4th century AD). This traditionally meant (until the Enlightenment suggested their own meanings) the lack of necessity in the human will, meant that “the will is free” meant “the will must not be as it is.” This requirement has been widely accepted by the compassionate and incompetent.  “When peace returns, and we should soon pray to God, the conference of the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, among which we hope that India will be counted and with which the colonies will be linked, will hopefully be frequent and regular events and feasts of our annual life.” The second point is that the details of the correct compassionate solution to the problem of free will/determinism are included in the details of the correct theory of counterfacts. Science has contributed to the problem of free will in at least three ways. First, physics has addressed the question of whether nature is deterministic, which is considered crucial by incompatibilites (but compatibilists consider it irrelevant). Second, while free will can be defined in different ways, it includes all aspects of how people make decisions and take actions that have been widely studied by neuroscientists. Some of the experimental observations are widely considered implicit that free will does not exist or that it is an illusion (but many philosophers see it as a misunderstanding). Third, psychologists have studied the beliefs that the majority of ordinary people have about free will and their role in assigning moral responsibility. Before we ask ourselves whether this pessimism about the compatibility of free will with determinism is justified, we should stop and ask ourselves whether there is really a fundamental disagreement between compathists and incompatibilities.
When an incompatibilityist says that determinism would deprive us of free will, we think we have real choices, including the ability to do something else, and if the Kompatibilist denies it, they say and deny the same sentence? Or does the incompatibility claim one thing while the compassionateist denies the other? This is intuitive, because it is natural to consider our future as “open” in the branched way suggested by the aneology of the streets, and to associate this kind of branching structure with freedom of choice.